Abstract : I defend just war theor y ogoinst pocifist, conventionolist, collectivist ond femini s t chollenges thot hove been recently directed ogoinst it. I go on to opply ju st war theory to the use ond threot to use nucleor weopons concluding thot under present condition s the possession but not t he t hreot to use o limlted nucleor force is morolly justified.
In troditionol just wa r theory, there ore two bosic components: o set of criterio which estoblish o right to go to war (jus od bellum) end o set of criterio which determine legitimote conduct in war (jus in bello). The first set of criterio con be grouped under the Iabel 'just cou se', the second under the Iabel 'just meons'. In recent yeors, the just couse component of ju s t war t heory hos been subjected to o pocifist chollenge, the just meons component hos been subjected to conventionolist ond collectivist chollenges end both component s hove been subject to o feminist chollenge . In this poper, I will ottempt to respond to eoch of t hese chollenges in turn end then go on to dete r mine the p r octicol implicotions of just war theory for nucleor str otegy.
The Pocifist Chollenge to Just Couse
In t rod itionol just war theory, just couse is usuolly specified os follow s:
Just Couse: There must be substontiol oggression end nonbelligerent correctives must be hopeless o r too costly.
Needless to soy, the notion of substontiol oggression is o bit fuzzy, but it is generolly understood to be the type of oggres sion thot violotes people's most fundamental rights. To suggest some specific exomples of whot is ond whot is not substontiol oggression, usuolly notionolizotion of porticulor firms owned by foreigners is not r egorded os substontiol oggression while the toking of hosto~;~es is so re go rded. But even wh e n substontiol Ryon goes on to orgue t hot there is o substontiol issue between the pocifist ond the nonpocifist concerning whether we con or should creote the necessory d istonce between our selves ond other h uman beings in order to mok e the oct of killing possible. To illu s trote, Ryon cites George Orwell's reluctonce to shoot ot an enemy soldier who jumped ou t of o t rench ond ron olong t he top of o poropet holf-dressed ond holding up his trousers with both honds. Ryon contends thot whot kept Orwell from shooting was thot he couldn't think of the soldier os o thing rother thon o fellow human being.
But do we hove to objectify other human beings in order to kill them? l f we do, this would seem to tell in fovor of the form of pocifism Ryon defends. However, it is not cleor thot Orwell's e ncounter s upports such o view. For it moy be thot whot kept Orwell from shooting the enemy sold ier was not hls inobility to think of the soldier os o thing rother than o fellow human being but rother his inobility to think of the soldier who was holding up his trouser s with both honds as o threot or a combatant. Under this Interpretation, Orwell's decision not to shoot would accord weil with the requirements of just war theory.
Let us suppose, however, that someone is a ttempting to take your life. Why does that permit you, the pacifist might ask, to kill the person making the attempt? lsn't such k illing prohibited by the principle that one should never intentionally do evil t hat good may come of it ? Of course, someone might not want to endorse t his principle as on absolute req uirement, but s u rel y it can not be reasonable to regard oll cases of justified killing in self-defense as exceptions to t his principle.
One response to this pacifist objection is to ollow tha t killing in selfdefense can be morally justified provided that the killing is the foreseen consequence of an action whose intended consequence is the stopping of the attempt upon one's life. Another response is to allow that intentional killing in self-defen se can be morally justified provided that you are reasonably certain that your attacker is wrongfully engaged in an attempt upon your life. lt is claimed that in such a case the intentional killing is not evil, or at least not marally evil, because anyone who is wrongfully engaged in an attempt upon your life has already forfeited her or his right to life by engaging in such aggression.
Taken together, these two responses seem to constitute an adequate reply to the pacifist challenge. The first response is thearetically doser to the pacifist's own position since it rules out oll intentional killing, but the second res ponse is also needed when it does not seem possäble to stop a th reat to one's life without intentionally killing one's attacker.
The Conventionalist Challenge to Just Means
Now the just mean s component of just war theory, can be specified as follows:
Just Means: I) The harm resulting from the belligerent means employed should not be disproportionate to the military objective to be attained. 2) Harm to innocents should not be directly intended as an end or a means. 3) Harm to innocents should be minimized by accepting risks (costs) to oneself that would not render it impossible to attain the military objective.
Obviously, t he notion of what is disproportionate is a bit fuzzy in (1), but the underlying idea is that the harm resulting from the belligerent corrective should not outweigh the benefit to be achieved from attaining the militory objective. By controst 1 (2) is o relotively precise requirement.
Where it was obviously violoted was in the ontimorole terror bombing of Dresden and Hornburg ond in the use of otomic bombs agoinst Hiroshimo ond Nogasaki in World War 11. 1
Some people think that (1) ond (2) capture the essential requirements of just means. Others mointoin that something like (3) is also required. Michael Walzer provides an example from Frank Richard's memoir of World War I which shows the ottroctiveness of (3).
"When bombing dug-outs or cellors 1 it was alwoys wise to throw the bombs into them first and have o Iook araund after. But we had to be very coreful in this village os there were civilians in some of the cellars. We shou ted down one cellar twice ond receiving no reply were just about to pull the pins out of our bomb when we heard a womon's voice and o young lad y come u p the cellar step s . .
• She an d the member s of her fomil y ... hod not left ( the cellor) for some doy s. They guessed an ottock was being mode ond when we first shouted down hod been too frightened to onswer.
If the young Iady hod not cried out when she did we would hove innocently murdered them oll." (Walzer 19771 152) Mony restrictions on the operotion of police forces also seem to derive from o requirement like (3).
As one would expect 1 these criterio of just meons have been incorporoted to some degree in the militory codes of different notions ond odopted os international low. Yet rorely hos onyone contended thot the criterio ought to be met simply becouse they hove been incorporoted into militory codes or odopted os international low. Recently 1 however 1 George Mavrode s 1 hos defended just such o conventionolist view (Movrodes 1983) . Mov rodes orrives ot this conclusion lorgely becouse he finds the standerd attempts to specify the convention-independent bosis for (2) ond (3) to be so totolly unsuccessful. All such ottempts 1 Movrodes cloims 1 ore bosed on an identification of innocents with noncombotonts. But by ony plausible standerd of guilt ond innocence thot hos morol content 1 Movrodes contends 1 noncombotants con be guilty ond combotonts innocent. For example 1 noncombotonts who ore doing everything in their power to finonciolly support an unjust war would be morolly guilty 1 ond combotonts who were forced into militory service ond intended never to fire their weopons ot onyone would be morally innocent. Consequently 1 the guilt/inhocence distinction will not support the combotont/noncombotont distinction.
Hoping to still s upport the combatant/noncombatant distinction 1 Movrodes suggests thot the distinction might be grounded on a convention to observe it. This would meon thot our obligotion to morolly obide by (2) ond ( 3) would be o convention-dependent obligotion. Nevertheless 1 Movrodes does not deny thot we hove some convention-independent obligations. Our obligation to refrain from wantonly murdering our neighbors is given as an example of a convention -independent obligation, as is our obligation to reduce the pain and death involved in combat. But to refrain from harming noncombatants when harming them would be the most effective way of pursulng a just cause is not included among our convention-independent obligations.
Yet Mavrodes does not claim that our obligation to refrain from harming noncombatants is ~ convention-dependent. He allows that, in circumstances in which the convention of refraining from harming noncombatants does not exist, we might still have an obligation to unilaterally refrain from harming noncombatants provided that our action will help give rise to a con vention p rohibitin g such harm with it s os sociated good con seq uences. According to Mavrodes, our primary obligat ion is to moximize good consequences , and this obligation requires that we refrain from horming noncombatants when thot will help bring about a convention prohibiting such harm. By cantrast, someone who held that our obligation to refrain from harming noncombatants was purely conventlon-dependent, would never recognize on obligation to unilaterally refrain from horming noncombatants. On a purely conventlon-dependent account, obligation s can only be derived from existing conventions; the expected consequences from estoblishing a particulor convention could never ground a purely convention-dependent obligation . But while Movrodes does not cloim thot ou r obligation to refrain from harming noncombotonts is purely convention-dependent, he does claim thot this obligotion generolly orises only when there exists o convention prohibiting such horm. According to Mavrodes, the reason for this is thot generolly only when there exlsts o convention prohibitlng harm to noncombatonts will our refroining from harming them, while pursuing o just cause, actually moximize good consequences .
But is there no other way to support our obligation to refrain from harming noncombatants? Movrodes would deny that there is. Consider, however, Mavrodes's own exomple of the convention-independent obligotion not to wantonly kill our neighbors. There are ot least two woys to understand how this obligotion is supported. Same would claim that we ought not to wantonly kill our neighbors because this would not moximize good consequences. This appears to be Mavrodes's view. Others would cloim that we ought not to wantonly kill our neighbors, even if doing so would moximize good consequences, simply because it is not reasonable to believe that out neighbors are engaged in an ottempt upon our Jives. Both these ways of understanding how the obligation is supported account for the convention -independent charocter of the obligation, but the second approoch, con also be used to show how our obligation to refroin from harming noncombatants is convention-independent. According to this approach since it is not reasonable to believe that noncombatan t s are engaged in an attempt upon our Jives, we have an obligation to refroin from harming them. So interpreted, our obligation to refrain from harming noncombatan t s is itself convention-independent, although it will certainly give rise to conventions.
Of course, some moy argue thot whenever it is not reasonoble to believe thot persans are engoged in an ottempt upon our lives, an obligotion to refroin from horming such persans will also be supported by the moximizotion of good consequences. Yet even if thi s were tr ue, which seems dou btful, oll it would show is that there e xis t s a utilitorian or forword-looking justificotion for o convention-independent obligation to r efroin from harming noncombatants; it would not show thot such an obligation is o convention-dependent obligotion, os Movrodes cloims.
The Collectivist Chollenge to Jus t Meons
Now occording to t he collectivist chollenge to ju st meons, more people s hould be included under the category of combotonts thon the standerd Interpre ta tion of (2) allows. The reason for this is thot the standord Interpretation of (2) does not assume, os the odvocotes of the collectivist chollenge do, thot t he members of o society ore collectively responsible for the oction s of their Ieaders unless they hove token rodicol steps to oppose or disossociote t hemselves from those octions, e.g., by engeging in civil disobedience or emigrotion. Of course, those who ore unoble to toke such s teps, porticulorly children, would not be responsib le in ony cose, but, for the res t, odvocotes of the collectivist chollenge cantend thot foilure to toke the necessory rodicol steps, when one's Ieaders ore octing oggressively, hos the consequence thot one is no Ionger entitled to full protection os o noncombotan t. Some of those who press t his objection ogoinst the just means component of just war theory, like Gregor y Kavka, cantend that the members of o society con be directly th reatened with nucleo r ottock to secu re de terrence but then deny thot corrying out such an a t tock could ever be morolly justified (Kovko 1985) . Others, like James Child, cantend thot the members of o society who foil to toke t he necessary rodicol steps can be both indirectly threatened ond in directl y ottacked with whot would otherwise be o dis p roportionate ottack ( Child 1986 ).
in response t his collectivist chollenge, the first thing to note is t hot people ore more responsible for disossociat ing themselves from the unjust acts of their Ieader s than they are for opposing those same octs. For there is no generot obligotion to oppose oll unju st acts, even oll unju s t octs of one's Ieaders. Nevertheless, t here is o generol obligotion to disossociote oneself from unjus t oct s and to minimize one's contribution to them. Of course, how much one is required to disossociote oneself from the unjust acts af one's leodel's depends upon how mu ch one i s contributing to those action s. If one's contribution is insignificant, as presumobly o farme r's or o teacher's would be, only o minimal effort to disossociote oneself would be required, unless one's action could somehow be reasonably expected, in Cooperation with the actions of others, to put a stop to the unjust actions of one's Ieader s. However, if one's contribution is significant, as presumab ly a soldier's or a munitions worker's would be, a maximal effort at disassociating oneself would be irTTnediately required, unless by delaying, one could reasonably expect to put a stop to the unjus t actions of one's Ieaders.
In support of the collectivist challenge, James Child offers the following example:
"A company is considering engeging in some massively irrmoral and illegal activity -pouring !arge quantities of a r senic into the public water supply as a matter of ongoing operations, Iet us soy. A member of the board of directors of t he company, when the policy is before the board, votes no but does nothing eise. Later, when sued in t ort (or charged in crime) with these transgressions of duty, she pleads that she voted no. What wou ld our reoction be? The answer is obvious! We would soy, your are responsible as much or nearly as much, as your fellow boar d members who voted yes. You should hove blown the whistle, gone public or to regulatory authorities, or ot the very least, resigned from the boord of so despicable a compony. Mere formal dissent in this cose does almost nothing to relieve her liability, legal or moral." (Child 1986, 142) But while one might agree with Child that in this case the member of the board of directors has at least the responsibility to disassociate herself from the actions of the board by resigning, this does not show that far mers and teachers are similarly responslble for disassociating themselves from the unjust oction of thelr Ieaders either by engaging in civil disobedience by emigr ation. This is because neither their contributions to the unjust actions of their Ieaders nor the effect of their disassociation on those unjust actions would typically be significant enough to requi re such a response. This is not to deny thot some other response (e.g. political protest or remunera t ions at the end of t he war) would not be marally required. However, to meet the collectivist challenge, it suffices to show that not just ony contribution to the unjust octions of one's Ieaders renders the contributor subject to a ttock or threat of ottack; one's contribution must be significant enough to morally justify such o response.
The Feminist Challenge to Just Couse ond Jus t Means
According to the feminist challenge to both components of just war theory, sexism ond militorism ore inextricobly linked in society. They ore linked, according to Betty Reardon , because sexism is essentially a prejudice against oll monifestations of the feminine, ond militarism is o policy of excessive militory preporedness ond eogerness to go to war thot is rooted in o view of human nature os limited to mosculine chorocteristics {Reordon 1985; especially eh. 3). Seen from o mi li tarist perspecti ve, other nat ions are competitive, aggressive ond odverse to cooperotion, the some troits thot tend to be fastered exclu sively in men in o sexist society. By cantrast, the troits of openness, cooperotiveness ond nurturonce which promote peoceful solutions to conflicts tend to be fastered exclusively in women who are then effect ively excluded from positions of power ond decision -moking in o sexist society. Consequently, if we ore to r id society of militorism, Reordon orgues, we need to rid society of sexism os weil.
But even gronting thot sexism ond militarism ore inextricobly linked in society in just the woy Reordon mointoins, how does this effect the volidity of just war theory? Since just war t heory e xpresses the volues of proportionolity ond respect for the rights of innocents, how could it be linked to militorism ond sexism? The answer is thot the linkoge is procticol rother thon theoreticol. It is becouse the Ieaders in militorist/sexist society hove been sociolized to be competitive, aggressive ond odverse to Cooperation thot they will tend to misopply just war theory when moking militory decisions. This represents an importont procticol chollenge to just war theory. And, the only woy of meeting this chollenge, os for os I con tell, is to rid society of its sexist ond militorist ottitudes ond practices so os to increose the chonces thot just war theory will be correctly applied in the future.
Procticol lmplicotion s for the Use ' of Nucleor Weopons
The requirements for just war theory thot hove been defended so for are directly opplicoble to the question of the morolity of nucleor war . In porticulor, requirements {2) ond {3) on just meons would prohibit any counter-city or counter-populotion use of nucleor weopons. While this prohibition need not be interpreted os absolute, it is simply not foreseeoble t hot ony use of nucleor weopons could ever be a morolly justified exception to this prohibition.
But whot obout o counter -force use of nucleor weopons? Consider the mass ive use of nucleor weopons by the United Stotes or the Soviet Union ogoinst indust r iol ond economic center s . Such o strike, involving three to five t housond worheods, could destroy between 70-80% of eoch notion's industry ond result in the immediate deoth of os mony os 165 million Americons and 100 million Russion s respectively, in oddition to running a con sideroble r isk of o retoliotory n ucleor s t rike b y the opposin g superpower. 2 It hos also been estimoted by Carl Sogon and other s thot such a strike is very likely to generote firestorms which would cover much of the eorth with sooty smoke for months, creoting o 'nucleor winter' thot would threaten the very survival of the human species {Sagan 1983). Applying requirement ( 1) on just means, t here simply is no foreseeable military objective which could justify such morally horrendaus consequences.
The same holds true for a massive use of nuclear weapons against tactical and strategic targets . Such a strike, involving two to three thousand warheads, directed against only ICBMs, submarine and bomber bases could wipe out as many as 20 million Americans and 28 million Russians respectively, in addition to running a considerable risk of a retaliatory nuclear strike by the opposing superpower. 3 Here too there is a considerable risk of a 'nuclear winter' occurring. This being the case what military objective might fore seeably justify such a use of nuclear weapon s ?
Of course, it should be pointed ou t t hat the above argument does not rule out a limited use of n uclear weapons at least against tactical and strategic torgets. Such a use is still pos sible. Yet practically it would be quite difficult for either superpower to distinguish between a limited and a massive use of nuclear weapons, e s pecially if a full-scale conventional war is raging. In such circumstances, ony use of nuclear weapons is likely to be viewed as part of a massive use of such weapons, thus increasing the risk of a massive nuclear retaliatory strike (Lens 1977, 78-79; Keeny/Panofsky 1981, 297f.; Clark 1982, 242) . In addition, war games have shown that if enough tactical nuclear weapons are employed over time in a limited area, such as Germany, the effect on noncombatants in thot area would be much the same as in a massive nuclear attack (Lens 1977, 73) . As Bundy, Kennen, McNamara and Smith put the point in their recent endorsement of a doctrine of no fir s t use of nuclear weapons:
"Every serious anolysis and every military exe rcise, for over 25 years , has demanstrated that even the mast restrained battlefield u se would be enormausly destructive to civilian life and property. There is no way for anyone to have any confidence that such a nuclear action will not Iead to further and more devastating exchanges. Any use of nuclear weapons in Europe, by the Alliance or against it, carries with it a high and inescapable risk of e scalation into ,the generat nuclear war which would bring ruin to oll and victory to none."
For these reasons, even a limited use of nuclear weapons generally would not meet requirement (1) on just means.
Nevertheless, there are some circumstances in which a limited use of nuclear weapons would meet oll the requirements on just means. For example, suppose that a nation was attacked with a massive nuclear Counterforce strike and lt was likely that, if the nation did not retaliate with a limited nuclear strike on tactical and strategic targets, a massive attack on its industrial and population centers would follow. Under s uch circumstances, it can be argued, a limited nuclear retaliatory strike would satisfy oll the requirements on just mean s . Of course, the justification for such a strike would depend on what foreseen effect the strike would have on innocent lives and how likely it was that the strike would succeed in deterring a massive attack on the nation's industrial ond population centers. But assuming a limited nucleo r retaliatory strike on toctical and strategic targets was the best way of avoiding a significantly greater evil, it would be morally justified according to the requirements on just means.
Practical lmplications for the Threat to Use Nuclear Weapons
Yet what about the morality of threatening to use nuclear weapons to achieve nuclear deterrence? Obviou sly, the basic requirements of just war theory are not directly applicable to threats to use nucleor weapons. Nevert heless, it seems cleor thot the just war theory would support the following analogaus requirements of whot we could call "just t h r eot theory ".
Just Cause: There must be a substantial threot or the likelihood of such a threot and nonthreatening correctives must be hopeless or too costly.
Just Mean s:
1) The risk of harm resulting from the use of threats (or bluffs) should not be disproportionote to the militory objective to be attained. 2) Actions that are prohibited by just war t heory connot be threotened os an end or o meons.
3 ) The risk of horm to innocents from the use of threots (or bluffs) should be minimized by occepting ri sk s (costs) to oneself that would not render it impossible to ottain the militory objective.
Now if we ossume that the requirement of just couse is met, the crucial restriction of just threat theory is requirement (2) on just means. This requirement puts a severe restriction on what we can legitimotely threaten to do, assuming, that is, that threotening implies an intention to carry out under appropriate conditions what one hos threatened to do. In foct, since, as we have seen, only o limited use of nucleor weapons could ever foreseeab ly be morally justified, it follow s from requirement (2) t ha t only such a use can be legitimotely threatened. Obviously, this constitutes a severe Iimit on the use of threats to achieve nucleor deterrence. Nevertheless , it moy be possible to achieve nuclear deterrence by other meons, for exomple, by bluffing. Now there are two ways tha t one can be bluffing while proclaiming that one will do octions that are prohibited by ju st war theory. One way is by not being comnitted to doing whot one procloims one will do should deterrence foil. The other is by being committed not to do whot one procloims one would do should deterrence foil. Of course, the firs t form of bluffing is more morolly problemotic tho n the second since it is less of o borrier to the subsequent formotion of o corrmitment to do whot would be prohibited by ju s t war theory , but since it Iacks o present corrmitment to corry out octions prohibited by just war theory should deterrence foil, it still hos the form of o bluff rot her thon o threot. 5
The possibility of ochieving nucleor deterrence by bluffing, howe ver, hos not been sufficiently explored becouse it is generolly not t hought to be possible to institutionolize bluffing. Rob ert Philllps in his con tr ibution to this volume roises just this objection to o bluffing strotegy. Bu t suppose we imogine bluffing to include deploying a survivable nucleor force and preporing t hot force for possible use in such a woy thot Ieaders who ore bluffing o morolly prohibited form of nucleor retolizotion need outwordly distinguish themselves from t hose who ore threatening such retaliotion only in thei r strong morol condemnotion of t his use of nucleor weapons . Surely this form of bluffing is copoble of being instit utionolized.
This form of bluffing con also be effective in ochieving deterrence becouse it is subject to ot least two Interpretations. One In terpretation is thot the Ieaders of o notion ore octuolly bluffing becouse while t he Ieaders do deploy nucleor weopons and do oppeor to threoten to use them in certain woys, they also mor oll y condemn those uses of nucleor weopons, so they con't reolly be intending to so use them. The other Interpretation is thot the Ieaders ore not bluffing but ore in foct Irrmoral agents intentionally corrmitted to doing whot they regord os o gros sly Irrmoralcou rse of oction. But since the Ieader s of other not ions con never be reosonoble sure which Interpretation is correct, o notion's Ieaders con effectively bluff under these conditions. Moreover, citizen s who think thot only o bluffing s trotegy wlth respect to certoin forms of nucleor retoliotion con ever be morolly ju s t ifled would Iook for Ieaders who express their own views on t his issue in just t his ombiguous monner. lt is also oppropriote for those who ore in ploces of high corrmond wi t hin o notion's nucleor forces to e xpress the some ombiguous views; only those low in the corrmond structure of o notion's n ucleo r forces need not express the some ombiguous views obout the cour se of oction the y would be corrying ou t , ossumin g they con see themselves os corrying out only (po rt of) o limited nucleor retolio tory strike. This is becouse, os we noted eorlier, such a strike would be morolly justified under cer toin conceivoble but unlikely condit ions.
Yet even gronting thot o threot of limited nucleor retoliotion ond o bluff of massive nucleor retoliotion con be justified by t he requirements of just meons, it would not follow t hot we ore presently justified in so threotening or bluffing unless t here presently exists o ju st couse for threotening or bluffing. Of course, it is generally assumed that such a cause does presently exist. That is, it is generally assumed that bath superpawers have a just cause to maintain a state of nuclear deterrence vis-d-vis each other by means of threats and bluffs of nuclear retaliation.
But to determine whether this assumption is correct, Iet us consider two possible s tances a nation's Ieaders might take with respect to nuclear weopons:
1) A notion's Ieader s might be willing to carry out a nuclear strike only in respon se to either o nuclear first strike or a massive conventional fi rst strike on itself or its principal allies. 2) A notion's Ieaders mlght be willing to carry out a massive conventional strike anly in response to either o nuclear fir st s trike or a massive conventional first strike on itself or its principal allies . Now assuming thot a notion's Ieaders were to adopt (1) and (2) then threots or bluffs of nuclear re taliatlon could not in fact be made against them! For a threat or bluff must render less eligible something an agent might atherwise want to do, and Ieaders of natians who adopt ( 1) and ( 2) hove a preference structure that would not be affected by any at tempt to threaten or bluff nucleor retaliation. Hence, such threats or bluffs could not be made agoinst them either explicitly ar implicitly.
Of cour se, a nation's Ieader s could try to threaten or bluff nuclear retaliation agoinst another nation but if the intentions of the Ieaders of that other nation are purely defensive then olthough they may succeed in restricting the liberty of the Ieaders of that other nation by denying them a possible option they would not have succeeded in threotening them for that would require t ho t they render less eligible something those Ieaders might otherwise wont to do. 6
Now if we take them a t their ward, the Ieaders of both superpowers seem to hove adopted ( 1) and (2 ) . As Caspar Weinberger recently characterized U.S. policy:
"Our strategy is a de fensive one, designed to prevent attock, particularly nuclear a ttack, again st u s or our allies." (Weinberger 1983, 3) And o similar statement of Soviet policy con be found in Mikhail Gorbochev's recent appeal for a return to a new era of detente (The New York Times, Moy 9, 1985) . Moreover, since 1982 Soviet Ieaders appeo r to have gone beyond simply endorsing ( 1) and (2) and have ruled out the use of a nucleor fir st strike under any circumstances. 7
Assuming the truth of these statements, it follows thot the present Ieaders of the U. S. and the Soviet Union could not be threotening or bluffing each other with nuclear retoliotion despite their opporent ottempts to do so . This is because o corrmitment to ( 1) and (2) rules out the necessory aggressive Intentions thot it is the purpose of such threats or bl uffs to deter. Leaders of not ions whose st rat egy ls o purely defensive one would be immune fr om threats or bluffs of nuclear retoliation . In fact, Ieaders of notions who claim their strotegy is purely defensive yet persist in a t tempting to threaten or bluff nuclear retaliation agoinst nations whose proclaimed strategy is also purely defensive eventually throw into doubt their own commitment to a purely defensive strotegy. It is fo r these r eosons, that o just couse for threotening or bluffing nuclea r retoliotion does not exlst under present conditions.
Of course, t he Ieaders of o super power might cloim t hot threotening or bluffing nucleor retaliotion would be morolly justified under present conditions on the grounds that the procloimed defensive strategy of the other superpower is not believoble. Surely this stance would be reasonable if the other superpower hod lounched an agg ressive attack ogainst t he s uperpower or it s principolly allies. But neither U. S. Interven tion in Nicaragua nor Soviet Intervention in Afghaniston no r other militar y actions taken by either superpower are directed against even a principal olly of the other superpower. Consequently, in the absence of an aggressive ottock of the approp r iate sort and in the obsence of an opposing militory force thot could be used without risking unacceptable Iosses from retoliotory s trikes, each superpower is morally required to provisionolly ploce some trust in the procloimed defensive strotegy of the other superpower.
Neverthe less, lt would still be morolly legitimote for both superpowers to retain a retoliotory nucleor force so os to be able to threoten or bluff nuclear retaliation in the future should conditions change for the worse. For os long os notions possess nuclear weapons, such a change could occur simply with a chance of leadership bringing to power Ieaders who con only be deterred by o threot or bluff of nuclear retoliotion.
For exomple, suppose o notion possesses o survivable nucleor force capoble of inflicting unocceptoble darnage upon it s adversary, yet possession of such o fo rce olone would not suffice to deter an odversory from corrying out a nuclear first strike unless that possession were combined wit h a threat of limited nucleo r retoliotion or o bluff of massive nuclear retaliotion. (With respect to massive nucleor retoliotion, bluffin g would be required here since Ieaders who recognize ond respect the obove ju st war constroints on the use of nuclear weapons could not in fact threaten such retollotion.) Under these circumstances, I think t he required threot or bluff would be morally justified. But I also think thot there is ample James P. Sterbo evidence todoy to indicote thot neither the leadership of the Un ited $ totes nor thot of the Soviet Union requires such o t h reot or bluff to deter t hem from corrying out o nucleor first s trike (see Kohon 1975; Lens 1977; Kendoll et ol. 1982; Kistiokowsky 1979; Aspin 1976; Adams 1981 ; much of this evidence is reviewed in my Ste rbo 1985). Consequently, under present conditions, such o threot or bluff would not be morolly justified.
Nevertheless , under present conditions it would be legitimote for o notion to mointoin o survivoble nucleor force in order to be oble to deol effectively with o chonge of policy in the future . Moreover, if either superpower does in foct horbor ony undetected aggressive Intentions ogoinst the other, the possession of o survivoble nucleor force by the other superpower should su ffice to deter o first strike since neither superpower could be sure whether in response to such strike the other superpower would follow its morol principles or its national interes t. 8
Of course, if n ucleor forces were only used to retoin the copocity for threotening or bluffing in the future should conditions chonge for the worse then surely at same point this use of nuclear weapons could also be eliminoted. But its eliminotion would require the estoblishmen t of extensive political, ecanomlc ond culturol ties between the superpowers so as to reduce the present uncertainty about the future direction of policy, and obviously the establishment of such ties, even when it is given the highest priority, which it frequently is not, requires time to develop.
In t he meontime a nuclear force deployed for the purpese of being capoble of t hreatening or bluffing in the future should conditions chonge for the worse, should be copable of surviving o first strike and then inflicting either limited or massive nucleor retaliation on an oggressor. Du ring the Kennedy-Johnson yeors, Robert McNamara estimoted that massive nucleor retaliation requlred o nucleor force capoble of destroying one-half of o notion's lndustriol copacity olong with one-quorter of its population, and comparoble figures hove been suggested by others. Cleorly, ensuring o loss in this neighborhood should constitute unacceptoble domoge from the perspective of any would-be oggressor.
Notice, however, t hat in order for o notion to mointoin o nuclear force copable of inflicting such domoge, it is not necessary t hot components of its land -, its oir -and its sea-based strategic forces oll be survivoble. Accordingly, even if oll of the land-bosed lCBMs in the United Stotes were totolly destroyed in o first strike, surviving e lements of the U. S. oir ond submarine forces could easily inflict the required degree of darnage and more. In fact, any one of the 37 nuclear submarines maintained by the United Stetes, each with up to 192 warhead s , could almest single-handedly inflict the required degree of darnage. Con seq uentl y, the U. S. s ubmorine force olone should suffice os o force copoble of massive nucleor retoliotion.
But what obout o nucleor force copoble of limited nucleor r etoliot ion? At least with respect to U.S. nucleor forces, it would seem thot as Trident I missiles reploce less occurote Poseidon missiles, ond especiolly when Trident II missiles come on line in the next few yeors, t he U.S. submarine force will hove the copacity for both limited ond ma ssive nucleor retaliotion. However, un til this modernizotion is complete, the U. S. will still have to rely, in part, on survivoble elements of its oir -and londbased strategic force s for its capacity to inflict limited nuclear retaliation. And it would seem thot the Soviet Union is also in a comparoble situotion. 9
To sum up, I have orgued for the following practical implications of just war theory and just threot theory for nucleor strategy:
1) Under present conditions, it is morall y justified to possess a survivob le nucleor force in order to be oble to quickly threaten or bluff nuclear r etaliation shauld conditions change for the wor se. 2) lf conditions do chonge for the worse, it would be morolly justified ot some point to threoten o form of limited nuclear ret oliotion . 3) lf conditions worsen further so that a massive nucleor first strike can anly be deterred by the bluff or threat of o massive nuclear retaliation, it would be morally justfied to bluff but not threaten massive nuclear retoliation. 4 ) Under certoin conceivable but unlikely conditions, o limited retoliotory use af nuclear weopons against toctical ond strategic targets would be morally justified in order to restore deterrence.
Now it still mig ht be objected that the nuclear s t rategy I hove been defending ls reolly not tho t different from the strotegies both the U.S. and the Soviet Union have already in ploce since my proposed s trategy still requires the massive deployment of nuclear weopons, and after oll doesn't the threot of nuclear attock derive from just such o deployment ond not f rom what the superpowers hoppen t o say abo ut the weapons they have deployed. 10 lt is true, of course, thot my proposed s trotegy does not go so far as to recomrnend the immediate removal of oll nuclear weapons, but it does differ f rom existing strategies in recomrnend ing, in the cose of the U.S., the porin g down of nucleor forces to the submarine force alone. I n oddition, my praposed strategy differs from existing strotegies in requiring a chonge in the rhetoric thot is used to refer to the nuclear forces that are deployed. For example, occording to the proposed strotegy, neither superpower con presently justify its deployment of nucleor forces on the grounds of provlding de terrence. Rother t hey mv st justify dep loyment on the grounds of providing the meons for quickly securing deterrence in the future should conditions chonge for the worse so that it is needed. Moreover, such chonges in rhetoric con hove o significont effect on the attitu de other notion s will toke with respect to the n ucleor forces deployed by the superpowers. Thu~, for exomple, the U.S.'s NATO ollies do not feel porticulorly threotened even by the nucleor forces currently deployed by the U.S. despite the foct thot technicolly slch forces could be used agoinst them os weil os ogoinst the Russions. 1 Whot occounts for this ottitude on the port of the U. S. 's NATO ollies is in lorge part the rhetoric thot the U. S. employ s when refer ring to those n ucleor forces becou se thot rhetoric reflects U. S. intentions with respect to those forces. Accordingly, the chonge of rhetoric ond the reduction of nucleor forces required by my proposed strotegy should hove a comporoble effect upon the relationship between the superpowers by indicoting more cleorly thot the stonce of the U. S. with respect to nucleor weopons is o purely defensive one thot is significontly limited by morol constroints .
Nevertheless, isn't there something better thon the procticol implicotions of just war theory ond just threot theory thot I hove just proposed? Whot about President Reogon's Strategie Defense Initiative or 'Star Wors' defense? Admittedly, this strotegy is presently only ot the reseorch ond development stoge, but couldn't such o strotegy tur·n out to be morolly preferoble to the one I hove proposed? Not os for os I con tell, for the following reosons.
Strategie Defense Initiative or SDI is sometimes represented os an umbrello defense and sometimes os a point or limited defense. As an umbrello defense, SDI is pure fontosy. Given the voriety of countermeosures either superpower might employ, such os shortening the booster phose of their rockets so os to moke them less of o torget for loser s an d dis per sin g vorious types of decoys, no defensive system could trock ond destroy oll the land-ond seo-bosed worheods either superpower could use in an oll out ottock. 12 Estimotes by supporters of SDI hove put the effectiveness of such o defensive system ot 30% (see Campbell 1984 Campbell , 1985 . This meons thot SDI could reduce by 30% the effective nucleor force either superpower might use ogoinst the other.
But o similor or greater reduction of nucleor forces could more eosily be ochieved by bilateral negotiotions if o reduction of nucleor forces is whot both superpowers wont. Moreover, o unilateral ottempt to get such o reduction though SDI is not likely to succeed. Either superpower only needs to increose their nucleor forces by 30% to offset the effect of SDI. And this is whot either superpower might do if they thought thot an SDI program was port of o generol defensive ond offensive nucleor buildup.
In oddition, the cost of SDI is astronomicol. President Reogon wonts a reseorch ond development budget for SDI of over 30 billion for the next five yeors . For comporison thot is more thon the total reseorch ond development ond production costs for the B 1 bomber or for the MX missile s y stem. And estimotes for the total cost of SDI ore in the neighbor hood of 1 trillion dollors. 13 For comporison the total U.S. fede r ol budget for 1985 was only 1.8 trillion dollors. Now what kind of a nation would spend 1 trillion dollars on an SDI that gave it a 30% reduction of the nuclear forces thot could be used ogoinst it -a reduction thot could hove been ochieved by bilateral negotiotions and would most likely be negated in the absence of such negotiotions? Certoinly not o notion thot is known for the wisdom of its Ieaders or its citizenry. For these and other reosons, I think that SDI is certoinly not morally preferoble to those procticol implications of just war theory ond just threot theory for nucleor strotegy that I have been defending.
Yet even if SDI is not morolly preferoble to the strotegy thot I have been defending in this poper, ore politicol Ieaders reolly thot concerned obout what policy is morally preferable? Aren't they more concerned obout what policy will serve their own interes ts or the intere sts of their constituents? Surely there is not denying thot determining whot policy is morolly preferoble is not oll thot actually does or should concern our political Ieaders. Bu t where the morol differences between policles ore significont -os is the case between existing strategies ond my proposed strategy, then our morol ronking of the options must be decisive at least for those who want to think of themselves os just and moral individuals. 14 Even if these bombings did help shorten World War II, and there is consideroble evidence thot they did not, they would have still been in violotion of requiremen t (2) on just meons.
2 The Effects of Nucleor War, Office of Technology Assessment (Woshington, D.C. U.S. Government Printing Office 1979), pp. 94, 100 ; Calder 1979, 150; Lens 1977, 102. 3 The Effects of Nuclear War, pp. 83, 91; Kohan 1975, 202; Lens 1977, 98, 99, 102. 6 On my view ta succeed in threatening two conditions must be met: 1) One must have the intention to carry out the action one is purporting to threaten under the stated conditions, that is, one must expect that if the stated conditions do obtain then one will carry out that action . 2) The preference structure of the party that one is trying to threaten must be so affected that something the party might otherwise have wanted to do is rendered less eligible.
7 See Leonid Brezhnev's message to the U.N . General Assembly on June 2, 1985.
8 lt might be objected that this proposed policy is hypocritical because it allows a nation following it to benefit from an adversary uncertainty as to whether that nation would follow its moral principles or its national interest. But it seems odd to deny a nation such a benefit. For we oll know that moral people can lose out in so many ways to those who are immoral. Occasionally, however, being immoral does have its liabilities and one such liability is that it is hard for immoral people to believe that others will not act in just the way they themselves do, especially when the benefits from doing so are quite substantial. Why then should not moral people be allowed to extract some benefit from the inability of immoral people to believe that moral people are as good as they say are. After oll, it is not the fault of moral people thot immoral people ore blinded in their judgment in this regard. Consequently, I see no reason not to allow a nation to benefit from its adversary's uncertainty as to whether it will follow the requirements of morality or those of national interest. 10 Robert Phillips has raised just this sort of objection in his contribution to this volume.
11 This is not to deny that the U. S. NATO allies and other nations might not still feel th reatened by the side-effects from an y u se of n uclear weapons against the Russians. It is just that because of the U. S . rhetoric, these nations do not feel threatened by any direct use of nuclear weapons. 13 Union of Concerned Scientists, "Boosting Star Wars", in: Nucleus, Val. 6 ( 1985) .
14 Of course, for those who do not want to think of themselves as just and moral individuals, we would need a further argument that grounds justice and morality in the requirements of reason or rationality. For such an argument, see my Sterba 1987. 
